NTSB cites track circuit failure and WMATA’s lack of safety culture
Written by jrood
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that last year's fatal collision of two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority trains on the Red Line in Washington, D.C., was a failure of the track circuit modules that caused the automatic train control system to lose detection of one train, allowing a second train to strike it from the rear. The NTSB also cited WMATA for its failure to ensure that a verification test developed after a 2005 incident near Rosslyn station was used system-wide. This test would have identified the faulty track circuit before the accident.
Contributing to the
accident was the lack of a safety culture within WMATA; ineffective safety
oversight by the WMATA Board of Directors and the Tri-State Oversight Committee;
and the Federal Transit Administration’s lack of statutory authority to provide
federal safety oversight. Additionally, WMATA’s failure to replace or retrofit
the 1000-series rail cars, after these cars were shown in previous accidents to
exhibit poor crashworthiness, contributed to the severity of passenger injuries
and the number of fatalities.
On June 22, 2009, at
approximately 5 p.m., train 112 struck the rear of stopped train 214 near the
Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C. The lead car of train 112 struck the
rear car of train 214, causing the rear car of train 214 to telescope about 63
feet into the lead car of train 112. Nine people aboard train 112 were killed
as a result of the accident, including the train operator, and dozens were
injured.
"The layers of safety
deficiencies uncovered during the course of this investigation are troubling
and reveal a systemic breakdown of safety management at all levels," said
Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. "Our hope is that the lessons learned from
this accident will be not only a catalyst for change at WMATA, but also the
cornerstone of a greater effort to establish a federal role in oversight and
safety standards for rail transit systems across the nation."
As a result of this
investigation, the NTSB made recommendations to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the FTA, TOC, WMATA, Alstom Signaling and transit authorities
in six states using GRS Generation 2 modules. Issue areas included safety
oversight, equipment inspection and maintenance guidelines and procedures, and
targeted equipment removal and replacement.
A synopsis of the NTSB
report, including the probable cause, conclusions and safety recommendations,
is available on the NTSB Website. The NTSB’s full report will be available on
the Website in several weeks.
