Transportation Safety Board of Canada Reiterates Call for Train Collision Avoidance Systems

RICHMOND HILL, Ontario –– The Transportation Safety Board of Canada this week released an investigation report on a near miss in 2024 and again called for implementation of train control systems.

In it’s report, the TSB pointed out that it has now released three recommendations for the installation of “physical fail-safe systems, such as positive train control (PTC),” and to expedite installation on “high-speed corridors and key routes.”

In its Investigation Report, TSB summarized the most recent near miss resulting in their latest recommendation:

“On 14 March 2024 at 1702 Eastern Daylight Time, eastbound GO Transit commuter train 1028 was departing the Waterdown commuter lead track at the GO Aldershot Station in Burlington, Ontario, when it passed by signal 344 displaying a Stop indication. The train then ran through a dual control switch lined in the normal position and entered track 3 of the Canadian National Railway Company Oakville Subdivision main line at Mile 34.4 without authority. After entering track 3, train 1028 was directly in the path of GO Transit commuter train 1775, which was proceeding westbound at 54 mph. Both trains were brought to a stop by their respective crews, avoiding a collision by approximately 549 feet. Together, the 2 trains had more than 400 passengers on board; there were no injuries to the passengers or to the crews.”

You can download and read the entire investigation report here:

Yoan Marier, Chair of the TSB, said “In this occurrence, a catastrophic collision involving 400 passengers was narrowly averted. . .underscoring the need for physical fail-safe train controls that can intervene when signal indications are not followed. For more than 25 years, we have been calling on industry and regulators to expedite the implementation of physical fail-safe train control systems and put strong interim measures in place while these systems are being developed and installed.”

The report includes an “action required” statement, which says:

“ACTION REQUIRED

Trains operating in Canada must have a level of protection against this safety issue equivalent to those operating in the United States.

The issue of not following railway signal indications will remain on the Watchlist until there is demonstrable progress in the following areas:

• Strengthening the monitoring of signal compliance, near-miss events, and targeted interventions.
• Implementing additional interim measures to mitigate the risks associated with train crews not complying with railway signal indications while physical fail-safe train control systems are being developed.
• Mandating and implementing physical fail-safe train control systems that automatically prevent collisions, overspeed, and derailments.”